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Abstract—The first OpenFlow Software-Defined Network
(SDN) Controller, NOX, was developed by Nicira Networks and
donated to the research community in 2008. Almost 10 years
later, there are at least 29 open-source SDN Controllers and
many more proprietary solutions. Two of the open-source SDN
controllers stand out in terms of broad deployment and strong
contributor base; Open Network Operating System (ONOS) and
OpenDaylight (ODL). Both have been deployed in live networks.
However, despite increasing adoption of SDN, the security of
the SDN control plane has developed at a snail’s pace. In this
paper, the evolution of ONOS and ODL security is discussed. The
reflection of this on secure SDN Controller design is analyzed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first OpenFlow SDN controller was NOX [1], which
was developed by Nicira Networks and donated to the research
community in 2008. NOX is a basic platform for building
network control applications. With the availability of Open-
Flow (OF) and NOX, research and development of SDN-based
architectures, network elements and controllers commenced.
Almost 10 years later, there are at least 29 open-source
SDN Controllers [2] and many more proprietary solutions.
This paper presents a detailed description of the evolution and
security status of two of the leading open-source Software-
Defined Network (SDN) controllers; Open Network Operating
System (ONOS) and OpenDaylight (ODL). The controllers
are assessed against a series of security features. ONOS
and ODL are relevant indicators of the state of secure SDN
controller design based on their large contributor base and
broad deployment.
In April 2013, the ODL project [3] was founded by a group
of member companies and hosted by The Linux Foundation.
The goal of the project is to accelerate the adoption of
SDN and create a solid foundation for Network Function
Virtualization (NFV). ODL is to be a common open-source
framework and platform for SDN. The first release was in
February 2014.
During 2014, the Open Networking Lab (ON.Lab) worked
with a number of industry partners and in December 2014
released the first code for ONOS [4]. ONOS was launched as
a SDN network operating system for service provider networks
with a focus on high availability, scalability and performance.
ONOS joined the Linux Foundation in October 2015.
In terms of the security of ODL and ONOS, arguably ONOS
took a lead from the perspective of resilience with the focus
on high availability (controller clustering) from the initial code
release. However, during 2014 and 2015, a series of security-
related events raised security awareness in both ODL and
ONOS. These events are highlighted in Fig. 1 and will be
discussed in Section III.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
related work with respect to the features of a secure, robust,
and resilient SDN controller. The evolution of secure design of
ONOS and ODL is presented in Section III and in Section IV,
the SDN controller security status is analyzed and discussed.
Section V concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. ODL and ONOS security-related events
II. RELATED WORK
A set of 11 features for a secure, robust, and resilient SDN
controller were defined in [5] and are summarized here.
Secure controller design:
1) Control process (application) isolation – the ability to sep-
arate the application processes running at the controller
in order to limit the capability of individual applications
to influence control of the network.
2) Implementation of policy conflict resolution – the ability
to resolve incompatible flow rules from multiple apps.
3) Multiple controller instances (resilience) – to overcome
the single, centralized controller as single point-of-failure.
4) Multiple application instances (resilience) – to handle co-
ordination of network state across multiple app instances.
5) Secure storage – to protect critical network-related data.
Secure controller interfaces:
6) Secure control layer communication – to protect control
communications to/from the data and application planes.
7) GUI/REST API security – to protect additional interfaces
to the controller such as web.
Controller security services:
8) IDS/IPS integration – support for integration of network
security applications to the controller.
9) Authentication and Authorization – support for access
control for users, applications, and resources.
10) Resource monitoring – the ability to protect against any
single application consuming excessive resources.
11) Logging/Security audit service – the collection of appro-
priate log information to enable security audit.
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In the same publication, this author presented a summary
of academic work related to the security of SDN/OF con-
trollers. To summarize, in [6], feature 6 was considered with
assessment of controller response to malformed OF messages.
Several features were considered in the security-enhanced
controller designs of [7], [8]. ODL and ONOS were relatively
new and there is no reference to security of ONOS in [6]–
[8], while [7] refers to security vulnerabilities in ODL. Since
2015, a number of works have addressed security vulnera-
bilities/threats to ONOS and ODL controllers and these are
discussed here.
Focusing on feature 1, in [9] a state-based permission
system is introduced to examine the permission set of each
application and prevent it from executing without permission.
The vulnerability of ODL v1.0 to Denial-of-Service (DoS),
system shell execution, and data plane poisoning (partially) is
demonstrated.
In [10], the authors provide a limited review on the security
threats to SDN controllers focusing on the north/southbound
interfaces (feature 6). There is no reference made to the
challenge of third-party applications. A few experiments using
ONOS v1.7.0 are described illustrating the ability to perform a
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack on an unencrypted channel
and to perform a DoS attack on the channel. No additional
attacks or solutions are described in this report as compared
with previous analyses.
Bidaj uses fuzzing to test network protocols and detect
vulnerabilities in [11]. This concerns features 6 and 10. The
study considers ODL Lithium-SR3 and Beryllium [3] and
ONOS v1.5. In terms of vulnerabilities, the predominant issue
identified through this testing is DoS due to excessive resource
consumption; memory or CPU. All five identified vulnerabili-
ties affect ODL. Fuzz testing with manipulated control packets
also produced exceptions indicating poor protocol implemen-
tation but not raising security issues. Six bugs affected ODL
v3.3 and v4.0 while three bugs affected ONOS v1.5. Although
the analysis is limited to the known DoS issue, one novel
contribution is a risk assessment of the threats based on a
scale derived from the ODL and ONOS security advisories.
In [12], the authors present a security analysis of ODL,
ONOS, Rosemary and Ryu SDN controllers based on the
Microsoft STRIDE analysis. They find that ODL is the most
secure of these controllers. However, the assessment credits
ODL with DoS mitigation, which is not the case, as will be
outlined in Section III. On balance, ODL and ONOS may be
closer in security level. The recommendations in [12] reflect
those previously identified in [5].
The focus of the related work on ODL/ONOS security has
been on a subset of the identified features (1,6 and 10). This
is also captured in an Appendix to the Open Networking
Foundation (ONF) technical recommendation “Security Foun-
dation Requirements for SDN Controllers” [13] in which the
compliance of a range of open-source controllers against the
security requirements is summarized. In the next section, the
ODL/ONOS security projects and applications developed by
the community are discussed.
III. EVOLUTION OF SECURE SDN CONTROLLER DESIGN
A. Open Network Operating System (ONOS)
1) Security Support: As identified in Section I, ONOS was
released after ODL and perhaps benefited from some lessons
learned in the deployments of early ODL releases. From the
outset, ONOS delivered a distributed architecture.
In January 2015, just following release of ONOS v1.0, ODL
was in the SDN media due to a vulnerability that took 4.5
months to be acknowledged and rectified by the developers
(see Section III-B for further detail). As a consequence, the
first ONOS CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)
raised in January 2015 was immediately patched. The ONOS
security response team was also created in early 2015 and the
security response system is described in the project wiki [14].
Just two CVEs are listed under security advisories for 2015
with a further 4 added in 2017. However, an analysis of the
ONOS JIRA for bug tracking identifies a volume of security-
related bugs.
2) Security-specific Projects: There is a separation in
ONOS between projects and applications. As such, the two
are presented here separately.
a) Security-Mode ONOS (SM-ONOS) [15]: This project
adds two main features to ONOS; application authentication
and role-based/permission-based access control. SM-ONOS
has been developed by KAIST.
SM-ONOS requires ONOS operators to review and accept
a security policy before activating each application. It uses
a permission-based approach where an application cannot
access a resource unless explicitly granted permission to do
so. Application authentication is enabled by the AppID. In
order to enable the application to access ONOS services, a set
of required permissions must be defined for the application.
These permissions relate to the services and APIs that the
application will require to interact with ONOS. For example
a permission of type APP READ provides permission to read
various information about installed applications. The permis-
sions required for the application are defined in the application
policy file, app.xml. Once the application is installed on ONOS
with the relevant permissions, it must be reviewed and the
requested permissions accepted before the application can be
activated. Otherwise activation will raise a policy violation.
One of the main issues with the SM-ONOS design is the
lack of fine-grained access control, effectively granting all
access or no access to certain controller features/functions
by the application based on two role types - user or admin.
A further consideration is that in order to effectively use
SM-ONOS, application policy files should be created for all
applications in use. The SM-ONOS developers proposed that
policy files could be generated for applications using a static
analysis approach. This has also been detailed as a feature of
ONOS v1.5 (see Table II). However, to the best of the author’s
knowledge based on communication with the developers, this
work has not and will not be progressed.
Following release of ONOS v1.6, a bug was identified
relating to SM-ONOS interaction with the consistent data store
in the ONOS core. Until a patch was issued, SM-ONOS was
incompatible with ONOS v1.6. As a result, unit tests have
been added from v1.9. However, while SM-ONOS remains
outside of the core ONOS build, the project remains unused.
b) Access Control based on DHCP [16]: This project
was proposed in July 2016 and is included here for com-
pleteness. However, there is no application code available or
evidence of development. The objective is to control customer
port access based on dynamic host configuration protocol
(DHCP) snooping. Only DHCP traffic would be allowed for
each customer port in “restricted” state. Once the DHCP server
grants access via DHCP ACK, the customer port would be
switched to “granted” state with customer traffic allowed.
Then, upon DHCP NAK or end of lease, the port/customer
is switched back to restricted state.
3) Security Applications:
a) ACL: ACL is a built-in ONOS application to build
access control lists. The access control list consists of 5-tuple
rules to allow or deny IP traffic. The application is integrated
with the distributed store to link ACL rules to relevant devices.
Various services are provided to map deny rules to allow rules,
to identify new ACL rule priority etc. The ACL application
was added to ONOS in July 2015 and released with Drake
in Sept. 2015. There has been some activity in 2016 with the
development of a test tool for the application. However, some
bugs remain unresolved [17].
b) AAA: In the most recent documentation, dated 11
March 2017, AAA is provided as an app within OpenCORD
[18], which is a reference implementation of CORD (Central
Office Re-architected as a Datacenter). In previous ONOS
versions, the AAA app was part of the core system, [19].
The intention of the AAA app is that it is the first element
that checks incoming traffic, leveraging the RADIUS server to
either block unauthorized traffic or open flows on the switch
to enable authenticated and authorized traffic. At the time of
writing, the AAA app only performs authentication. Based
on conversations in the ONOS mailing lists, this app is a
placeholder for future community development.
The estimated maturity of each ONOS security project and
application described in this section is noted in Table I. The
maturity is based on assessment of the functionality provided
and ease of implementation of the solution.
TABLE I
ESTIMATED MATURITY OF ONOS SECURITY PROJECTS/APPLICATIONS
Project/ Proposal Estimated Comment
Application Date Maturity
SM-ONOS Jan. 2015 Medium Functional but limited practical
use as not part of core ONOS
AC - DHCP Jul. 2016 N/A Project description only
ACL Jul. 2015 Low Application developed but
implementation issues logged
AAA Sept. 2015 Low Authentication only;
Not part of core ONOS
4) Security-focused design: Since the first version of
ONOS, there have been a number of security improvements.
As highlighted in Section I, although resilience in terms of
high availability was a design focus from the beginning, in the
first version of ONOS, AAA was largely missing. There has
been a progressive improvement in the ONOS security features
with each new software version. For example, GUI/REST
API/CLI security settings and TLS/SSL support are now
included.
However, as described in the previous sections, features
that would offer protection against some of the threats/attacks
described in [7], [9], are not fundamental to the control
design but rather offered as applications. Although authentica-
tion mechanisms are now provided, there is no authorization
mechanism implemented in ONOS. So, for example, it is
not possible to distinguish user rights such as allowing a
user to view all applications but disallow the same user to
start/stop/remove applications. The evolution of the security
features/functionality in ONOS is detailed in Table II.
B. OpenDaylight (ODL)
1) Security Support: An initial ODL security analysis was
performed in May 2014 [22]. The report details a series of
security features, summarized in Table III. However, there
was little progress in implementing the recommendations.
This is particularly evident from the recommendation in the
conclusion of the report “to have a special mechanism to
report security bugs/issues to OpenDaylight”. In August 2014,
Gregory Pickett, a security researcher at Hellfire Security,
discovered a vulnerability in ODL, which he flagged to the
developers. It took until January 2015 for a patch to be
generated. Following this event, ODL introduced a public
security mailing list, a security advisories web page and a
security response team.
In January 2015, David Jorm presented ODL’s security
vision to be an industry-leading, secure engineering function
with security documentation, developer training for security,
and automated quality engineering/continuous integration jobs
to catch issues and regressions [23]. In July 2015, Jorm pre-
sented further updates on ODL secure development processes
[24] and introduced the Secure Engineering Intern project with
objectives of documenting best practices and a threat model,
automating checks for known-vulnerable dependencies, and
automating static analysis checks. The project appears to have
been allocated but no results have been reported.
Details of ODL security systems and efforts are provided
at [25]. The ODL Security Advisories web page [26] lists all
the security vulnerabilities fixed in ODL. The list is active.
2) Security-specific Projects: Each of the security-related
projects of ODL are discussed here.
a) Controller Shield [27]: As highlighted in Figure 1,
ODL launched this project in August 2015 just before the 1st
code release of SM-ONOS. The objective of the project is to
collate security-related information for protection of the con-
troller and expose this information to northbound applications.
It is comprised of two elements: 1) Unified Security Plugin
(USecPlugin): This plugin registers for Packet-In notifications
and calculates packets-per-second (pps) on a flow basis. An
alarm is generated if a pps threshold is exceeded and the alarm
is exposed to northbound applications. The USecPlugin was
proposed for the ODL Beryllium version with extension in
the Boron version. 2) East-West interface protection: With
this service, the controllers are authenticated before an inter-
controller BGP session is initiated. This service was proposed
for release with Boron.
TABLE II
EVOLUTION OF SECURITY FEATURES IN ONOS DESIGN
Version Release Date Security Features
Avocet (v1.0) December 2014 High Availability
Blackbird (v1.1) February 2015
Cardinal (v1.2) May 2015
Drake (v1.3) September 2015 GUI and CLI require username and password login; REST interfaces require username and password; TLS support
for inter-node communication; Configurable HTTPS for GUI and REST API; Security-Mode ONOS for application security
Emu (v1.4) December 2015
Falcon (v1.5) March 2016 [Automatic application security policy extraction using static analysis techniques (KAIST)]; SecurityGroup feature of OpenStack
Goldeneye (v1.6) May 2016
Hummingbird (v1.7) September 2016 [New subsystem for anomaly detection (ATHENA [20]) (SRI)]; Rate limit on port via NetConf (GEANT)
Ibis (v1.8) November 2016
Junco (v1.9) February 2017 Implemented unit test for Security-Mode ONOS, Integrated Security (DELTA) tests into OnosSystemTest
Kingfisher (v1.10) June 2017 Added support of security group to openstack/networking-onos and SONA (Simplified Overlay Network Architecture) [21]
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF ODL SECURITY FEATURES, MAY 2014 [22]
Security Feature Comment Recommendation
Application Bundle Security Bundles provide some level of isolation Augment with bundle signature/permission verifiers at loadtime, bundle access
security at runtime; Bundle authentication/authorization should be logged
OSGi Runtime Container Security Concerns with security footprint of Karaf Make Karaf security documentation available to ODL developers
- ODL Apache Karaf Distribution and administrators
ODL Controller Plugins Security Secure communication access to the controller; Provide secure access for 8 plugins, DDoS attack protection on
5/13 plugins use secure versions of protocol plugin exposed ports, use a common crypto key storage,
and support pluggable/built-in CA
AAA for External Users Supports secure access via NB API Provide role-based access control for external users, user access
authentication, access protocol authorization, services/resource
authorization, auditing access/authorization pluggable AAA service
Secure Device/Controller BootStrap Controller/Device Discovery is manual Zero-touch bootstrap requirements - automatic device discovery
Authentication and Authorization and AAA support
Controller Clustering and Security Clustering comms channel should be secure Configure Jgroups AUTH and ENCRYPT support for security
The code for USecPlugin has been developed. However,
the east-west interface protection has not been progressed and
there is no recent activity.
b) Cardinal - ODL Monitoring as a Service [28]: This
project is noted here as it offers a fault/health monitoring
service, which could be extended or integrated for security
services. For example, the provision of CPU/memory usage
information for resource monitoring related to network attack.
The objective of Cardinal is to enable legacy network man-
agement systems to inter-work with ODL. Cardinal consists
of an abstraction layer for exposing monitoring, diagnostics
and events to northbound monitoring and analytics applica-
tions. The adaptor has been developed and supports snmpd,
snmptrapd agents with planned enhancements for SNMPv2c
trap and info messages, and further versions/agents.
c) AAA [29]: The AAA project was launched in ODL
mid-2014. The identity of users is authenticated, and user ac-
cess to resources is authorized and recorded. The user authenti-
cates to the controller with a username/password combination
and receives an access token to access protected resources
on the controller. Access to specific resources is determined
by the user role and permissions. ODL leverages the Apache
Shiro Java security framework to provide AAA services. Shiro
provides four elements: (1) Authentication, (2) Authorization,
(3) Cryptography, and (4) Session Management. ODL uses
priority ordering to ensure that the AAA function processes
incoming requests before any other filtering is performed. It
is assumed that the AAA security implementation will not
change significantly with future ODL versions, based on the
stability of the documentation from prior releases. The change
logs indicate that the AAA app is still being developed, with
recent bug fixes available.
d) Defense4All [30]: Defense4All (D4A) was the first
security application developed for ODL. It was submitted by
RadWare in 2013 as an open-source version of their Defense-
Flow product for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks. D4A
was released with Hydrogen and provides a system for detect-
ing attack traffic and redirecting it based on ODL’s monitoring
and control capabilities. It operates by using OF flow entries
to capture flow statistics; coarse flows at the network edge for
high volume detection, and fine-grained flows near protected
servers. Traffic redirection is also implemented with OF flow
entries. D4A provides the attack detection while attack mitiga-
tion requires specialized equipment. The mitigation manager in
D4A supports the selection and configuration of these external
devices. It is noted that the D4A REST API does not check for
credentials or define user roles to authorize usage of certain
REST APIs. There has been no activity on the Defense4All
application since January 2015.
e) Secure Network Bootstrapping Interface (SNBI)
[31]: SNBI is used for securely bootstrapping the network
infrastructure by automating the setup process for required
devices and their credentials. The SNBI project was proposed
in May 2014. The SNBI process begins with Neighbour
Discovery (using IPv6 addressing). Once a neighbour is dis-
covered, the protocol requests the device domain certificate to
verify if the device is already bootstrapped. If it is not, the
bootstrap of the new device is initiated by the proxy device.
With SNBI, the registrar is hosted in the SDN Controller and
is the trusted entity in the network domain. The SDN controller
also contains a plugin for the secure discovery service to
communicate with the network devices. Network devices must
run the SNBI software package for the secure discovery
service. New devices then discover the domain by searching
for the SNBI registrar, and present their 802.1AR credentials.
Once authorization is confirmed, the new device enrols with
the domain and establishes a secure communication channel.
This process assumes same domain membership of the device
and the SNBI registrar.
The first release of the SNBI solution was with Helium with
additional features added in Lithium and Boron. There is no
further development plan but the project is maintained.
f) Unified Secure Channel (USC) [32]: The objective of
this project is to provide a unified secure communication tun-
nel between the network element and controller to guarantee
unified bidirectional secure communication across unsecured
public infrastructure. According to the project scope, USC
should offer a secure channel with two-way initiation, two-
way authentication, and should support multiple protocols
in parallel. This project has been contributed by Huawei
Enterprise and was released with Lithium. The project is still
active with commitment to the Carbon release.
The estimated maturity of the ODL security projects is
noted in Table IV. The maturity is based on assessment of
the functionality provided.
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED MATURITY OF ODL SECURITY PROJECTS
Project Proposal Estimated Comment
Date Maturity
Defense4All Aug. 2013 Medium Solution available, not maintained
SNBI May 2014 High Solution developed and maintained
AAA Jun. 2014 High Extended functionality
USC Dec. 2014 High Solution developed, ongoing updates
Controller Aug. 2015 Low Basic functionality,
Shield no recent development
Cardinal Mar. 2016 High Solution developed, ongoing updates
3) Security-focused design: There is clear progress towards
the integration of security features and functionality in ODL.
Both the number of security-related projects detailed in the
previous section and the attention of the security response team
is evidence of this. However, due to the more distributed (and
larger) community of developers of ODL, it is hard to deter-
mine the extent of adoption or deployment of these security
services beyond their development team. Only 1 of 3 project
leaders responded to an inquiry regarding the current/planned
development activities and the use of the tools by ODL users.
The evolution of the security features/functionality in ODL are
detailed in Table V.
IV. DISCUSSION
The security support, projects, applications, and the
security-focused design of ONOS and ODL have been detailed
in Section III. The objective of this paper is not to provide a
direct comparison of these two open-source controllers from a
security perspective, rather to offer an assessment of the state
of security of open-source controller design with ONOS and
ODL being the most advanced of those deployed.
With regard to the controller security attributes described in
Section II, there has been an improvement in security features
across both controllers since their initial releases, specifically
considering AAA functionality (features 9 and 11). However,
the implementation is weak in places. For example, the default
username and password are easily obtained from the online
documentation. In the case where the default credentials are
active, there is unlimited access to the controller. If the
username/password has been changed, it may still not be too
difficult to gain access to the controller. For example, there
is no defence against a simple brute-force attack to capture
the controller credentials. Unsuccessful attempts to access the
REST interface are not logged, there is no limit on the number
of unsuccessful attempts that can be made to connect to it nor
is there any concept of blacklisting certain connections that
continuously attempt to connect to it. In fact, some of the
2017 CVEs highlight just such vulnerabilities [26], [34].
The lack of progress on elements such as resource mon-
itoring (feature 10) and application isolation (feature 1) is
disappointing. These are controller security issues that have
been raised repeatedly. This lack of real progress on secu-
rity is also reflected in the maturity level of the security
projects/applications described in Tables I and IV. Several of
the projects lack development progress. Of the higher maturity
projects, it has not been possible to capture statistics regarding
the adoption rate.
As noted in Section II, in July 2016, the document “Se-
curity Foundation Requirements for SDN Controllers” [13]
was published by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF)
Security Working Group (SecWG). This document provides a
detailed breakdown of security requirements derived from a
threat analysis of the SDN controller. However, an inquiry to
ON.Lab indicated that they were not aware of the document
while no response was received from the ODL security list.
The drive in the SDN community (strongly driven by
ONF) is towards open-source software rather than standards
development. The OSSDN Project Delta [35] has also emerged
from the ONF SecWG. Delta provides a penetration testing
framework for SDN, which predominantly explores the impact
of the threats in SDN on the controller. Positive feedback has
been received since the launch of Delta in 2016. Education of
developers on the importance of secure SDN controller design
is perhaps better served by the presentation of tools such as
Delta. With hands-on tools, the vulnerability of the controller
TABLE V
EVOLUTION OF SECURITY FEATURES IN ODL DESIGN
Version Release Date Security Features
Hydrogen February 2014 Defense4All DDoS attack detection and mitigation tool
Helium September 2014
Lithium June 2015 New features for security and automation:
Unified Secure Channel eases secure communication between ODL and widely distributed networking equipment;
Time Series Data Repository (TSDR) enables collection and analysis of large amounts of network activity;
Device Identification and Driver Management (DIDM) provides end users the ability to discover, manage and automate a wide range
of existing hardware in their infrastructure;
Persistence ensures application-specific data is preserved over time or in the event of a catastrophe;
Topology Processing Framework allows for filtered and/or aggregated views of a network, including multi-protocol, underlay/overlay
Beryllium February 2016 New features for performance and scalability:
Stronger analysis and testing of clustering, applications that want to be cluster-aware can choose how to put data across the cluster;
Fully support OpenStack High Availability and Clustering
Boron September 2016 NetVirt project enhanced support in OpenStack environments for IPv6, Security Groups (via OpenFlow configuration) and VLANs.
Cardinal project monitors the health of the controller, delivered as a service to existing, deployed network monitoring and analytics tools.
Centinel analytics engine enables end-to-end data collection and machine learning to support performance monitoring and bandwidth
management across WAN links [33].
Carbon June 2017 NetVirt and Genius projects integrate to dynamically create and manage tunnels and virtual network functions on demand.
to specific attack types/threats can be demonstrated, which can
have a greater impact than a written recommendation.
However, ownership of the secure design/development must
be taken by the core ONOS/ODL teams. The concept of
these security projects and applications succeeds to design
security features for the controllers. However, it fails when it
comes to addressing the fundamental security of the controller
architecture and the goal of “secure by design”.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The security evolution of two leading open-source SDN
controllers; ONOS and ODL has been presented in this paper.
It is encouraging to see an increasing focus on security
within both controller communities through security support
and new features introduced with each new software release.
Of concern, however, is the lack of integration of security
as a core feature of the controller. While there are many
project/application proposals for secure controller functional-
ity, there is limited implementation of secure controller design.
These controllers must be hardened for deployment in public
networks.
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